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Abstract 
A member state of the European Union can use its term as the Council president to make progress on pending 
but stalled proposals which it would like to see adopted. This case study of the directive on the risk arising from 
physical agents shows how a Council presidency can use issue subtraction, additional meetings and compromise 
proposals to overcome gridlock in the Council. There is a notable difference in terms of legislative activity 
between the presidencies of high regulation and low regulation countries. High regulation countries put forward 
compromise proposals and scheduled additional meetings to resolve outstanding issues. The case study also 
demonstrates the importance of issue subtraction. The original proposal was gridlocked in the Council for five 
years. Only after the original proposal was split up into several dossiers (issue de-coupling) was it possible to 
reach agreement. 
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As European legislation impinges to an increasing degree on European citizens and 
companies, member state governments strive to influence EU legislation to minimise 
adoption costs in respect of different regulatory styles, to benefit their domestic 
industries or to address the concerns of their constituencies which can only be resolved 
transnationally. Countries with a high level of regulation in particular will try to extend 
their regulatory regime to the European level to shield their domestic industry from 
competition due to lower regulatory costs and/or to increase the market size for their 
products in line with their own regulatory standards (Scharpf 1999; Heritier, Knill, & 
Mingers 1996). A member state can use the opportunity of its term as the Council 
president to make progress on pending but stalled proposals. Member states with high 
levels of national regulation in an area benefit from leveling the playing field by 
establishing European-wide regulation. In contrast, member states that benefit from 
unequal levels of regulation because of their lower domestic standards do not have an 
incentive to push for legislation by the EU. The Council presidency acts as the ‘agenda 
manager’ in the Council (Tallberg 2006: 82-112) and can use its procedural prerogatives 
to push for legislation according to its own national priorities (Warntjen 2007). Thus, we 
would expect to see more legislative activity on a dossier during a presidency that has 
higher regulatory standards. By scheduling more meetings the presidency can provide 
the necessary time to find a solution acceptable to all member states or increase the 
pressure on recalcitrant member states to give up their opposition. If a presidency has 
an interest in overcoming gridlock on a certain dossier it will also make an extra effort to 
resolve this issue by formulating compromise proposals and/or by arranging issue 
linkages or de-coupling issues. 
The office of the Council presidency offers a member state a number of tools to advance 
a gridlocked piece of legislation. For example, it can arrange bilateral meetings to 
identify the concerns of individual member states and use indicative votes to put 
pressure on some member states. Package deals, which compensate losses on one issue 
by providing gains on another, are frequently mentioned as a tool to overcome gridlock 
(Heisenberg 2005; Mattila & Lane 2001). Issue subtraction provides another possibility 
for unlocking stalled proposals (Hug & König 2002; Sebenius 1983). It reduces the 
complexity of a proposal, which might make it easier to reach agreement. Furthermore, 
issue subtraction in the form of sequential bargaining can help to build momentum. 
Thus, issue subtraction might help to unlock a previously gridlocked dossier. 
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This case study of the directive on the risk arising from physical agents shows how a 
Council presidency uses issue subtraction, additional meetings and compromise 
proposals to facilitate progress. In 1994, the Commission put forward a proposal that 
covered four physical agents (electromagnetic radiation, noise, optical radiation, 
vibrations). This proposal, however, languished in the Council for five years without 
being actively considered. In 1999, the German presidency proposed to split up the 
directive into four, each of which covered one physical agent. After this de-coupling of 
issues, a common position was agreed upon in the Council for all four directives in the 
space of five years. In this time period, a presidency which had an interest in seeing 
European legislation adopted in the area of occupational health and safety was more 
active in trying to ensure agreement than a country at the helm that had no particular 
interest in that area. With only one exception, all new proposals were put forward by 
high regulation countries (Denmark, Germany and Sweden). In addition, the 
presidencies of high regulation countries generally scheduled more meetings to resolve 
outstanding issues. For example, the working group discussing the noise directive met 
four times during both the German and Finnish presidencies, but only once during the 
Portuguese presidency. 
This study adds to the existing literature on legislative decision-making in the Council 
and the Council presidency in several respects. First, in a detailed case study it 
empirically elucidates the causal mechanisms (issue subtraction, compromise proposals, 
and additional meetings) that link the interest a Council presidency has in reaching 
agreement on a given dossier and legislative activity in the Council. An earlier statistical 
analysis provided evidence for the existence of a link between salience and the number 
of adopted acts (or adopted common positions) for environmental policy in the time 
period 1984-2001 (Warntjen 2007); it could not, however, show how the presidency 
pushes for legislation. This case study shows that a presidency which has a higher 
interest in a dossier schedules more meetings of the working group and prepares 
compromise proposals to find agreement. Second, it highlights the so far largely 
neglected role of issue subtraction (or issue de-coupling) in overcoming legislative 
gridlock in the Council. The next section describes the theoretical effect of issue 
subtraction (removing political obstacles, reducing complexity, building momentum) in 
detail, which is also a prominent feature of the case study. Issue subtraction is a well-
established concept in the literature on international negotiations; bringing it into the 
study of EU legislative decision-making facilitates cross-fertilisation of these two fields of 
study. The case study shows that issue subtraction can be an important factor in 
overcoming gridlock in the European Union. Third, the study uses a comprehensive 
measure of the main independent variable for all member states based on the qualitative 
literature which is cross-validated using several quantitative indicators (ratification of 
international conventions, transposition of social policy directives, and exposure of 
workers to physical agents). Fourth, this study raises the question of whether the 
sequence of presidencies matters. A number of member states with a high level of 
interest in European-wide regulation succeeded each other in a relatively short time 
period, with only a few intermediate presidencies with little or no interest in the topic. 
Does such a sequence of presidencies help to maintain the necessary momentum which 
makes it more likely that gridlock is overcome? 
This study uses a number of indicators to deliver a detailed assessment of the interest of 
the various presidencies in pushing for legislation in a certain area and shows how the 
presidency uses its prerogatives to achieve agreement on regulation in line with its 
national priorities. Tallberg (2006: 82-112) provides one example where the presidency 
successfully pushed for an initiative in external relations (the Finnish presidency and the 
Northern Dimension) and one where the presidency stalled legislation (the German 
presidency and the end-of-life vehicles directive), but not an example of overcoming 
gridlock in the legislative domain. Sherrington (2000: 125, 150-1 and 108-9) reports 
three examples of legislative dossiers in which presidencies tried to fast-track items 
which may have been due to national priorities, but does not offer a detailed 
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examination of the mechanisms used by the presidency to reach agreement. In contrast 
to Warntjen’s (2007) positive finding, Wurzel’s (2004) comparative case study of four 
British and German presidencies concludes that there is little evidence for a relationship 
between salience and legislative activity in the field of environmental policy. Extending 
the analysis to a different policy field (occupational health and safety) can help us to 
resolve this controversy. 
 
THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY, LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY AND ISSUE SUBTRACTION 
IN THE COUNCIL 
A member state can use its presidency to focus attention on a gridlocked proposal that is 
of particular interest to it. Besides devoting more time to an issue, the presidency can 
push for agreement on a legislative dossier by tabling compromise proposals and using 
issue subtraction or addition. The interest a member state government takes in an area 
of European regulation is affected in two ways (Warntjen 2007: 1138). Firstly, electoral 
and ideological considerations (Tallberg 2003: 9) are significant: the higher the issue 
rates among the core constituency of a government, the dearer the topic will be to it; 
secondly, the economic ramifications of having a European-wide regulation imply that a 
member state whose industry will be significantly affected by changes in the regulatory 
environment will attach more importance to the topic. Regulations affecting the 
production process – like environmental regulations or regulation on occupational health 
and safety - potentially add to the production costs. As the principle of mutual 
recognition guarantees access to the markets of the other member states, high level 
regulation states cannot force their higher standards upon member states with lower 
levels through unilateral action (i.e. non-tariff trade barriers). Thus, states find 
themselves in a competition of regulatory standards (Sun & Pelkmans 1995). In this 
situation, member states with high levels of regulation have an incentive to strive for 
European-wide regulations (Heritier et al. 1996: 11-15; Scharpf 1996: 23-25; Rehbinder 
& Stewart 1985: 10-13;). Any form of European-wide regulation would benefit them as it 
implies (progress towards) a level playing field. For example, the Maastricht Treaty 
refers to establishing ‘minimum requirements’ regarding the health and safety of 
workers (Article 118a Paragraph 2 TEC); member states can still adopt (or maintain) 
higher national standards (Fairhurst 2009: 266). In addition, member states with a large 
economic sector producing machinery, which effectively has to comply with process 
regulations, benefit from European-wide regulations (Scharpf 1999: 110; Heritier et al. 
1996: 24). Such countries could use their time at the helm in the Council to push for 
European regulations in areas like occupational health and safety policy. 
The Council presidency gives a member state a unique opportunity to push for legislation 
to which it attaches high salience (Warntjen 2007; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006: 
148; Tallberg 2003). It is the presidency that decides on the legislative work programme 
in the Council. It drafts the agendas and chairs meetings at all levels of the Council 
(Tallberg 2006: 86-7; Westlake & Galloway 2004: 35; Kirchner 1992: 76, 90-1, 104). 
Using its prerogatives as the chair in individual meetings, the presidency can put 
pressure on member states to make concessions (de Bassompierre 1988: 25-6) and use 
‘confessionals’ with individual member states to push for an agreement (Hayes-Renshaw 
& Wallace 1997: 147). Furthermore, the presidency can hold indicative votes to isolate 
individual delegations (Westlake & Galloway 2004: 41). The powers of the presidency 
are not unlimited and its influence on the legislative agenda is constrained by the 
existing agenda, events that require attention, as well as the need to get sufficient 
support for a proposal and to stay within acceptable boundaries of (self-interested) 
behaviour (Niemann & Mak 2010; Warntjen 2008; Tallberg 2006: 87- 90). Nevertheless, 
the procedural prerogatives of the presidency do allow a member state to promote 
certain initiatives and thus to prioritise some proposals in line with its interests 
(Warntjen 2007; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006: 148-9; Tallberg 2006: 11). In 
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particular, it can schedule extra meetings, put forward compromise proposals and set up 
issue linkages or de-couple issues to facilitate decision-making. 
The Council presidency is in charge of agenda management in the Council (Tallberg 
2006: 82-112). Thus, it can focus the attention of the Council on certain topics by 
scheduling extra meetings. At any given moment, there are a number of pending 
proposals but only a limited amount of resources (in terms of staff and time) to address 
them. Finding agreement on an issue, however, takes time. When discussing a 
legislative proposal, legislators have to deal with the uncertainty regarding the link 
between a proposed policy and its effects. Legislative actors are primarily interested in 
the outcome of a given policy, but cannot be sure which policy will produce the outcome 
closest to their most preferred outcome (Krehbiel 1991: 61-68). Besides these technical 
aspects, bargaining partners have to understand the positions and possible reservations 
of the other actors in order to reach agreement. In other words, the necessary 
transaction costs of decision-making have to be met before a negotiation can be 
concluded successfully. This includes the allocation of sufficient time, allowing a group to 
exchange viewpoints and conduct negotiations (Furubotn and Richter 2000: 45). Having 
a meeting on an issue can also signal the intention of an actor to make progress. This 
can help to build momentum (see below), particularly if the actor, like the presidency, 
can influence the course of decision-making. 
Negotiators often have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences, which can lead to 
protracted exchanges of proposals and counter-proposals. Negotiations, however, imply 
opportunity costs. The presidency can help to overcome the negotiators’ dilemma by 
putting forward a compromise proposal based on private information about the positions 
of the bargaining partners that it receives in its role as an ‘honest broker’ (Warntjen 
2008: 205; Tallberg 2006: 112-141). 
Besides allocating more time to an issue and providing compromise proposals, the 
presidency can arrange issue linkage or issue subtraction to facilitate decision-making in 
the Council. Despite high voting thresholds and high preference heterogeneity in the 
Council, member states manage to agree on a substantial amount of legislation every 
year. In fact, there is a tendency to reach agreement by consensus even if the necessary 
majority exists to adopt a legislative proposal. A prominent explanation for this pattern is 
issue linkage (or vote trading): an actor votes for a proposal that s/he is opposed to but 
which is of little consequence for him/her in exchange for a vote by another actor on an 
issue that is more important to him/her (König and Junge 2009; Heisenberg 2005; 
Mattila and Lane 2001). Another tool for overcoming gridlock that has received less 
attention so far is issue subtraction. Due to its central role in the negotiations as the 
agenda manager and its prerogative of making compromise proposals, the presidency 
can use issue linkage or issue subtraction to overcome gridlock in the Council. Under 
certain circumstances, issue subtraction (also referred to as issue decomposition, issue 
disaggregation, issue separation or fractionation) can allow bargaining parties to 
conclude successful negotiations on complex and gridlocked issues (Fisher 1969: 90-95; 
Hampson 1999: 45-7; Hopmann 1998: 80-1; Sebenius 1983). Issue subtraction implies 
that an issue is now considered on its own merit, independent of other issues. A clear 
example of issue subtraction is a situation where issues are considered by different 
groups or organisations. However, even within a single negotiation issue subtraction can 
take place if issues are considered at different moments in time or if issues are 
considered simultaneously but without the possibility of linkage (Sebenius 1983: 288). 
Sequential bargaining, for example, decouples issues by dealing with issues one after 
another (Sebenius 1991: 134-5). The presidency chairs all meetings in the Council and 
can de-couple issues, for example by restricting the debate to certain issues or holding 
an (indicative) vote on one issue before moving on to the next. Similarly, it can propose 
to split a proposal and to discuss the separate proposals sequentially. Decoupling issues 
increases the chances for successful negotiations for three reasons. First, issue 
subtraction can remove political obstacles to the conclusion of negotiations. Second, 
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issue decomposition reduces the complexity of negotiations. Third, issue decoupling can 
create momentum towards an agreement. The first aspect focuses on a primarily static 
analysis of the preference configuration whereas the latter two stress the character of 
negotiations as a dynamic process. 
The higher the number of issues that are touched upon in a proposal, the higher are the 
chances that one of them raises political conflict. This is particularly relevant for a 
decision-making body which, like the Council of the European Union, has a high voting 
threshold and values consensus (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006: 259-295). The 
governments have to consider in turn the interests of their domestic constituency, 
including the producers in the economic sectors affected by the proposed legislation, and 
parliamentary majorities. Comprehensive pieces of legislation are more likely to fail 
because they potentially mobilise a larger number of opposing groups. When structuring 
the negotiation agenda, one can increase the likelihood of success via the ‘preemption of 
potential blocking coalitions’ (Sebenius 1991: 134). Even if all issues under discussion 
are contended, it might be easier for the recalcitrant side to give in on one issue rather 
than making concessions across the board (Fisher 1969: 93-95). The presidency holds 
bilateral meetings with member states to get a more detailed understanding of the 
various concerns of member states. When putting forward a compromise proposal in the 
Council it can accommodate those concerns by adding exemptions for specific sectors 
(e.g. suggesting that regulation on noise at the workplace would not apply to engine 
rooms on ships, which is a major concern for member states with a large maritime 
sector such as Greece). Reducing the scope of a directive effectively reduces the number 
of potentially contentious issues. Similarly, longer transitional periods can remove 
political obstacles to agreement. Furthermore, reaching a partial agreement quickly 
rather than holding out for a comprehensive settlement reduces the risk of the positions 
of bargaining partners shifting (e.g. due to elections) which might complicate matters 
even more. 
Negotiations are complex affairs: the concerns that hold back governments from giving 
their approval to a given proposal need to be understood, potential solutions have to be 
discovered, other member states have to be sounded out on a new proposal, etc. Issue 
decoupling, that is focusing on fewer issues simultaneously can increase the chances of 
finding common ground. In the regulatory realm particularly, legislative proposals can 
involve a number of technical issues: how can default values be measured? What are the 
effects of certain threshold values? What are the effects of exemptions or transitional 
periods vis-à-vis the stated goal of the proposal? The more issues a proposal addresses, 
the higher the complexity of the negotiations due to the multi-faceted technical aspects 
of the discussions. At a certain stage, the complexity of these discussions can become 
overwhelming, leading to negotiation failure. A high number of issues, and hence a high 
degree of complexity, might simply overtax the cognitive abilities of the negotiators 
(Watkins 2003: 153-4). Thus, the technical complexity of a proposal might obscure the 
fact that sufficient support for a compromise proposal exists. Finally, issue decoupling 
(or incremental or sequential bargaining) can increase the chances of reaching 
agreement because it helps to build momentum (Watkins 1998: 252). Investigating 
possible compromises (e.g. in the form of exemptions or transitional periods) requires 
resources. Bargaining parties might not be willing to expend those resources if an 
agreement seems to be out of reach anyhow (Kingdon 1984: 175-6). However, reaching 
agreement on one aspect of a legislative dossier can rekindle discussions on other 
aspects as an overall solution now seems more feasible than before (Fisher 1969: 94). 
Reaching (partial) agreements (on sub-issues) early in negotiations can lead to an 
‘escalating commitment to agreement’ (Pendergast 1990: 139) as the time spent on 
negotiations becomes a sunk cost. The presidency can structure the agenda of Council 
meetings to focus on some issues initially and subsequently lock in the benefits of partial 
agreement while using the momentum generated to reach agreement on so far 
unresolved issues. Furthermore, there can be a technical spill-over effect. Agreeing on 
European legislation on one issue can increase the substantive need for (or the benefits 
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of) regulation on a related issue. A partial agreement can thus mobilise (domestic) 
interests and result in more pressure to find agreement on other issues as well (Nugent 
2006: 562-3). Finally, as a decision becomes more likely, participants might abandon 
maximalist bargaining positions and engage in a more compromising manner in the 
negotiations to shape the eventual outcome (Kingdon 1984: 169-70, 176), which in turn 
increases the chances of reaching agreement. 
Thus, issue subtraction can potentially be used to overcome gridlock because it might 
remove obstacles to reaching agreement, reduce complexity and – in the form of 
sequential bargaining – build up momentum. The Council presidency can use this tool to 
advance issues that are of particular importance to it. In addition, it can use its 
procedural prerogatives regarding agenda management and make compromise proposals 
to facilitate agreement on legislative dossiers. 
 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY: IDENTIFYING LEADERS AND LAGGARDS 
The governments of the member states of the European Union have a long tradition of 
regulation of health and safety in the work place and different systems and levels of 
regulations have emerged in the EU member states (Vogel 1994). By estimating which 
member states adopted stringent regulations at a high level we can identify lead nations 
who are likely to be willing to use their time in the presidential seat to push for 
European-wide legislation. After discussing qualitative assessments of the comparative 
level of regulations in the (EU-15) member states, I will cross-validate this ranking using 
a number of quantitative indicators. Besides countries with high levels of regulations 
(e.g. the Nordic countries), countries that have a large economic sector which exports 
machinery (e.g. Germany) which has to comply with occupational health and safety 
regulations, would be particularly interested in legislation in this area. Having to comply 
with European-wide regulations only rather than with different national regulations 
makes it easier for them to cater to a larger market. At the end of the section, I present 
the relevant figures from EUROSTAT on the relevance of domestic industry exporting 
machinery in the member states. 
Based on a comprehensive review of several indicators and the existing descriptive 
literature, a comparative qualitative assessment of the regulatory level of occupational 
health and safety in EC member states differentiated between three groups of countries 
with low, medium, and high standards (Eichener 2000: 59-64). The first group is 
characterised by rudimentary protection in the working place and high risk. This group 
includes Greece, Portugal, and Spain. In Italy, occupational health and safety is decided 
upon on a regional basis. Southern Italy also belongs to the group of low standards, 
whereas the standards are generally higher in the North. Ireland has adopted higher 
standards, notably in the Safety, Health, and Welfare at Work Act of 1989, but lags 
behind in implementation; hence, Eichener (2000) locates it between the low and 
medium group. A second group of countries exhibits notable levels of regulation with 
respect to risks to health in the work place due to the physical environment. This group 
includes Belgium, France, Great Britain, (northern) Italy, and Luxembourg. West 
Germany is located at the higher end of this group due to its traditionally high technical 
levels of regulation, whereas Eastern Germany would be part of the lower group. It 
should be noted in this respect that after re-unification West German standards and 
legislation commonly applied in East Germany. High levels of workplace health action in 
Germany are also attested by another comparative study, which contrasts this to low 
values for the United Kingdom and Ireland (Wynne & Clarkin 1992: 154). The top group 
not only has high levels of regulations concerning traditional perceptions of risks, but in 
addition – unlike Germany - employs a holistic approach towards health risk due to 
work. This includes health risks due to the organisation of work. Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Sweden form this group of member states with high levels of regulation 
of occupational health and safety and an innovative and comprehensive approach to 
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combating risk in this area. Another comparative study of thirteen EU member states 
(Piotet 1996: 81) concludes that besides the Scandinavian countries, Germany and the 
Netherlands feature occupational health and safety systems that go beyond mere 
prevention of accidents and disease, but stimulate actions taken against ill-health in its 
wider meaning. 
To cross-validate this categorisation of leaders and laggards in occupational health and 
safety policy, we can turn to a range of quantitative indicators. Unfortunately, national 
regulations on the risk of physical agents in the work place are subject to different legal 
cultures. In the absence of a comprehensive study that would allow direct comparison of 
national standards, only rough estimates based on indirect measurements can be 
provided (Rantanen et al. 2001). 
The first set of quantitative indicators concerns the general level of occupational health 
and safety standards as measured by ratification of international conventions on this 
issue and the transposition of European directives on social policy. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the average delay in (correct) transposition for six European directives on 
social policy (e.g. on parental leave, working time, young workers) (Falkner et al. 2005). 
Three caveats have to be noted. First, a delay in transposing a directive might be due to 
factors other than a low level of regulation (e.g. a federal decision-making structure, 
political conflict, etc.). Second, the regulatory standards on social policy in general might 
not reflect those in occupational health and safety. Third, the data that was used is 
truncated; some of the directives were not fully implemented in the time period covered 
by the study. 
 
Table 1: Transposition of European Directives in the Area of Social Policy 
 AT BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK 
D
el
ay
 
34.7 41.4 40.8 10.1 32.6 33.7 53.1 44.5 17.9 48.8 41.1 14.9 50.3 28.3 20.8 
R
an
k 
8 11 9 3 6 7 15 12 2 13 10 1 14 5 4 
Source: Falkner et al. (2005: Table 13.6), delay is given as an average for six directives in months; own 
calculations. 
 
The data broadly supports the distinction made in the qualitative literature. The 
Netherlands occupies the first place. The Scandinavian countries are all in the top half of 
member states. Germany is part of the middle group. In contrast, countries like Greece, 
Italy and Portugal show a low performance in transposing European directives. The 
position of Ireland (second place) is surprisingly high. 
Member states that voluntarily sign up to international conventions to protect workers in 
the work place are more likely to have strict regulations on occupational health and 
safety in place, either as a consequence of committing to international standards or 
because they support the convention on the basis that they have already adopted strict 
national measures. 
 
 
Volume 9, Issue 1 (2013) jcer.net  Andreas Warntjen 
 47 
Table 2: Ratification of International Conventions 
 AT DE DK ES FI FR IE IT LU PT SE UK 
Ratifications 
(%) 14 68 41 64 82 50 23 45 18 41 82 18 
Rank 9 2 6 3 1 4 7 5 8 6 1 8 
Source: Rantanen et al. (2002: Table 6); own calculations 
 
Table 2 lists the percentage of conventions of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) ratified by 12 EU member states. Countries which adopted a high number of ILO 
conventions tend to have the highest legal coverage in the area of occupational health 
and safety (Rantanen et al. 2001: 32). Unfortunately, the ranking only includes 12 of the 
(then) 15 member states. The top three countries are Finland, Sweden (joint first rank), 
and Germany. Finland and Sweden both ratified 82 per cent of the ILO conventions, for 
Germany the value is 68 per cent. Spain occupies the third place with 64 per cent. 
Eichener (2000: 60), however, notes Spain’s notoriously weak national laws on 
occupational health and safety, characterised by a lack of clear definitions of key terms 
and a binding nature. Thus, the overall pattern – with the exception of a relatively low 
value for Denmark – confirms the categorisation of the qualitative studies. 
The second set of quantitative indicators concerns the conditions in the work place. 
Countries with high levels of regulation (and enforcement) should exhibit lower exposure 
of workers to risks from physical agents. The European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions carried out a number of surveys on working conditions 
which allow us indirectly to gauge the relative level of regulation in EC/EU member 
states (Paoli 1992, 1997). An important caveat is that the surveys report on the 
subjective impression of working conditions, not the level of regulations directly. Thus, 
what constitutes ‘appropriate’ machinery or what ‘loud’ means might be understood in 
different ways in the countries included in the study. The surveys were carried out as a 
part of the Eurobarometer with an oversampling of persons in active employment. 
Table 3 provides the ranking of the surveys for 1991 and 1996 with regard to exposure 
to physical agents (noise, vibrations, radiation). In 1991, interviewees were also asked 
whether they had ‘appropriate machines and tools’ to carry out their work (Paoli 1992). 
Regarding noise, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany feature the lowest exposure to 
noise (in the category ‘at least 25% of the time’). With regard to appropriate machines, 
the leading countries with the highest percentage of workers reporting having 
appropriate machinery are Ireland, Spain and Germany (joint second place), and 
Denmark and Great Britain (joint third place). The good standards in Ireland can be 
explained by the high level of investment in new machinery at that time (Eichener 2000: 
57). In the 1996 survey, the member states that joined the Union in 1995 were 
included. Furthermore, questions on the exposure to vibrations from hand tools and 
machinery and radiation by sources such as x-rays, radioactivity, laser beams, or 
welding lights were added (Paoli 1997). Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands exhibit the 
lowest exposure to noise (i.e. they have the highest values in the category ‘almost never 
or never’). The survey reports the responses for West and East Germany separately, in 
the table the values for West Germany are used which only ranks fifth (East Germany 
would rank second). The Scandinavian countries report relatively high levels of 
exposure, contrary to our expectations based on the qualitative literature. Regarding the 
exposure to vibrations, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark (joint second place), and 
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Belgium and United Kingdom (joint third place) exhibited the lowest levels of exposure. 
Finally, respondents from Italy and Portugal (joint first place), France and Belgium (joint 
second) and Ireland and The Netherlands (joint third) reported the lowest exposure to 
electromagnetic radiation. The differences here are less pronounced than for the other 
physical agents, presumably because electromagnetic radiation is less common than, 
say, noise or vibrations. In line with the qualitative literature, the Netherlands as well as 
countries like Belgium, France and – to a lesser degree – (West) Germany performs well 
in the rankings. In contrast, Sweden and Finland have lower and Ireland and Italy 
unexpectedly high rankings in light of the qualitative literature. This could be due to 
different expectations in these countries as to what constitutes a safe work place. 
 
Table 3: Exposure to Physical Agents in the Workplace 
 AT BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK 
1991 
M
ac
h
in
es
 
-- 77 87 84 87 -- 72 81 88 75 81 81 76 -- 84 
N
oi
se
 
-- 23 24 26 32 -- 31 32 31 25 28 20 28 -- 28 
1996 
N
oi
se
 
73 77 72 71 71 61 70 62 70 79 72 76 72 69 69 
V
ib
ra
ti
s 
73 82 71 85 70 74 77 63 76 80 75 87 70 85 82 
R
ad
ia
ti
on
 
91 96 94 93 94 92 96 93 95 97 94 95 97 92 94 
Source: Paoli (1992: pp. 17 and 45), Paoli (1997: Tables 4.2, 4.7, 4.12), rounded values for 1991. 
Note: For machines, the values are the percentages of respondents reporting appropriate machinery. 
Otherwise the percentages are for the answer category indicating the least amount of exposure (e.g. 
‘almost never or never’). The surveys reports responses for East and West Germany separately, the 
West German values were used in the table. 
 
The descriptive literature distinguishes between leaders in occupational health and safety 
(the Scandinavian countries plus the Netherlands), a group of high technical (but not 
necessarily innovative) regulatory standards comprised of countries such as Germany, 
France or Belgium, and mainly Southern laggards. This picture is largely confirmed by 
the ratification of international agreements as well as the transposition record and, albeit 
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to a lower extent, by surveys of the working conditions. Italy and Ireland have 
unexpectedly high rankings. 
Another reason to place an item high on the legislative agenda would be the importance 
of a domestic industry which is affected by a given dossier. Regulation of the exposure of 
workers to noise and vibrations affects the building of machinery. The machinery 
building industry would prefer a uniform European-wide regulation as this allows it to 
reap the benefits from economies of scale as it can build for a larger market, rather than 
having to accommodate different national regulations. Denmark and Germany have the 
highest percentage of employees (14 per cent) in machinery building of the national 
industrial labour force in the EU. Germany also has the densest concentration of 
industrial workers in the machine building industry. The top seven regions most 
specialised in the manufacture of machinery are all in Germany. Machinery also plays an 
important part in German exports and thus in the German economy. Indeed, in 2003 
German production comprised 37.7 per cent of value added by the manufacture of 
machinery and equipment of the EU-27 (Eurostat 2006). Thus, we would expect a 
German government in particular to rate dossiers which affect the manufacture of 
machinery very highly. 
In sum, we should expect a push for legislation on occupational health and safety when 
the Council presidency is occupied by a North European country. Besides the 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Germany and to some degree France and 
Belgium stand out in the different indicators as member states with innovative and/or 
comprehensive national regulations of occupational health and safety. Germany and 
Denmark have a further interest in directives concerning machinery due to their large 
industry producing machinery.  
 
OVERCOMING GRIDLOCK: THE IMPACT OF THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY ON THE 
GRIDLOCKED REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 
Member states with high levels of regulations and/or a large industry exporting 
machinery have the greatest interest in establishing European-wide regulations in the 
area of occupational health and safety. The Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and 
Germany have high standards and, in the case of Germany and Denmark, an additional 
economic incentive to push for European levels. The case study shows how these 
countries used the presidency to push for legislation in this area. The focus of the case 
study will be on reaching political agreement in the Council in first reading. Later 
readings are subject to strict deadlines which largely determine the timing of events. 
Thus, the presidency largely has to react to external events in that phase. In contrast, a 
bill can potentially stay in first reading indefinitely, which allows the presidency to 
prioritise some items in line with its national preferences. The formal adoption of a 
common position in the Council is sometimes delayed to allow for linguistic and legal 
work on the final proposal. 
Large differences in the legislation on workplace safety still existed in the member states 
of the EC at the beginning of the 1990s (Vogel 1994; Wynne & Clarkin 1992: 56-69). 
The completion of the Single Market as well as the new provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Social Charter gave an impetus to development of a comprehensive 
European regulation in the area of occupational health and safety (Wynne & Clarkin 
1992: 51-55). The Commission made a proposal for a new directive on the minimum 
health and safety requirements regarding the exposure of workers to the risks arising 
from physical agents (electromagnetic fields, noise, optical radiation, vibrations) in July 
1994 (COM 94/284). Within the group of the (then twelve) member states, only 
Germany and the Netherlands already had specific national regulations with strict 
thresholds in place regarding all of the physical agents covered by the proposal. 
Subsequently, the proposal was stalled in the Council for five years until successive 
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presidencies of member states with high levels of regulation in occupational health and 
safety pushed for new European-wide regulations (interviews Commission official, 13 
June 2005; Council official, 6 June 2005; Council official, 27 June 2005).1 After the 
German presidency suggested dividing the comprehensive proposal on all four physical 
agents into several dossiers (issue de-doupling), political agreement in the Council was 
reached on all of them within five years. Nearly all of the new proposals were put 
forward by the presidency of high regulation countries, which also scheduled additional 
meetings and put together compromises to reach agreement during their term in office 
(Table 4). 
Two weeks into its term of office, the German presidency gave new impetus to the 
physical agents directive in January 1999. It suggested splitting up the original proposal 
and having separate directives on the different physical agents, noting the difficulty of 
the member states to reach agreement addressing all of the different sources of rísk 
simultaneously (Agence Europe, No. 7470, 22 May 1999). Furthermore, it submitted a 
proposal covering vibrations (Council Document 1320/98). The argument for starting 
with vibrations was that there currently was no European regulation on vibrations, that 
there was a clear link between vibrations and occupational diseases and that scientific 
knowledge was most advanced in this area (PRES/00/454). In addition, in the view of 
the German presidency this was the area where agreement could be reached relatively 
quickly (Council Document 5825/99). However, it stressed that the other physical agents 
should be addressed in due course as well. Thus, the German presidency tried to create 
momentum by focusing on an area where agreement was likely, which would revitalise 
discussion on the other issues as well. The Council’s Social Questions Working Party met 
twice in February 1999 and again in March and June of the same year to discuss the 
German proposal for a directive on vibrations. The general approach of the presidency 
was explicitly supported by eleven member states (Council Document 6939/99). During 
the Finnish presidency in the second half of 1999, the working party met another four 
times. Under the German and Finnish presidencies, the working party resolved 
fundamental issues of how to define and assess risks, how to limit exposure, on aspects 
of worker information and training, and health surveillance (Council Document 
12689/99). At the end of the Finnish presidency, the working group put forward an 
amended proposal (Council Document 5322/00). Reviewing the progress made during 
the Finnish presidency at their meeting on the 29 November, the ministers were hopeful 
that a Common Position could be adopted during the upcoming Portugese presidency 
(European Report 1999). However, there was only one meeting of the working group 
during the Portugese presidency. Issues that were still debated included the scope and 
possible derogations from the directive, whether or not there should be limit values of 
exposure in addition to values at which action was required and how detailed the 
provisions on measurement should be. Some of these issues were resolved in two 
meetings at the working group level during the French presidency in the second half of 
2000 (Council Documents 13071/00). The remaining issues were the inclusion of limit 
values, transitional periods and derogations. The French presidency presented a new 
compromise proposal addressing these issues in the Coreper meeting on 24 November 
2000. It suggested higher values and a longer transitional period (Council Document 
13697/00). Subsequently, political agreement was reached at the meeting of the 
Employment and Social Policy Council on 27 and 28 November 2000 (Council Document 
13875/00). 
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Table 4: Legislative Activity in the Council on the Physical Agent Directives 
Year Presidency Activity 
Vibrations 
Noise Electromagnetic Optical 
1994 Germany Commission 
Proposal 
   
1995-1999 FR, ES, IT, IE, 
NL, LU, UK, AT 
No activity in the Council 
1999 Germany Proposal to 
split directive 
New proposal 
4 meetings 
WG 
   
 Finland 4 meetings 
WG. 
   
2000 Portugal 1 meeting WG    
 France 2 meetings 
WG 
Presidency 
proposal 
COREPER (pol. 
agreement) 
Council (pol. 
agreement) 
   
2001 Sweden Council 
(common 
position) 
New proposal 
9 meetings 
WG 
COREPER 
(pol. 
agreement 
Council (pol. 
agreement) 
  
 Belgium  Council 
(common 
position) 
  
2002 Spain No activity in the Council 
 Denmark   Conference 
Council 
discussion 
Presidency 
proposal 
1 meeting WG 
 
2003 Greece   5 meetings WG 
Council 
discussion 
 
 Italy   3 meetings WG 
COREPER (pol. 
agreement) 
Council (pol. 
agreement) 
Council (common 
position) 
 
2004 Ireland    Conference 
Presidency 
proposal 
 Netherlands    5 meetings 
WG 
COREPER (pol. 
agreement) 
Council (pol. 
agreement) 
Council 
(common 
position) 
Source: Council of the European Union, protocols of meetings. WG = Council Working Group. 
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The Swedish presidency presented a proposal for a directive on noise a few weeks into 
its term in office in January 2001 (Council Document 5474/01). The Social Questions 
Working Party met a total of nine times during the Swedish presidency to discuss the 
proposal. Similarly to the directive on vibrations, discussions focused on the scope of the 
directive, inclusion of limits and the possibility of derogations (Council document 
9101/01). The Swedish proposal was discussed in Coreper on 1 June 2001 which noted 
that a number of issues had to be resolved at the ministerial level (Council document 
9484/01). For example, Greece was concerned about the scope of the directive 
extending to workers on ships and airplanes. A compromise suggested by the presidency 
was to set an additional transitional period of five years for seagoing vessels, thus 
removing a political obstacle to reaching agreement on this issue. Another contentious 
issue concerned the maximum values. Denmark was pushing for lower values and 
references to international guidelines, whereas Italy, Greece and Spain argued that the 
values were already too low, putting too much of a burden on companies (European 
Report 2001). On the basis of a compromise proposal of the Swedish presidency, 
political agreement on a common position for the noise directive was reached in the 
Council in June 2001 (Council document 9855/01). The preamble contained a reference 
to international standards which could provide guidance, but whose implementation was 
left to the member states. Several member states (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands) 
had national legislation in place that was stricter than the proposed European legislation 
regarding the overall exposure levels (Agence Europe, No. 8329, 29 October 2002). 
There was no activity in the Council on the remaining physical agents during the Spanish 
presidency in the first half of 2002. The Danish presidency, however, organised a 
conference on electromagnetic radiation in September 2002 in Copenhagen and the topic 
was discussed again in the Council in October 2002. Subsequently, the Danish 
presidency presented a proposal of a directive on electromagnic fields and waves in 
December 2002 (Council Document 15400/02). After being discussed once at the Social 
Questions Working Party during the remaining weeks of the Danish presidency, the 
proposal was discussed several times during the Greek and Italian presidencies in 2003. 
As with the previous directives, discussions at the working group level focused on the 
scope of the directive and limit values. For example, the working group debated at one 
of their four meetings in this period whether static electric fields should be subject to the 
directive. Furthermore, there was a discussion on the length of a transitional period 
(Council Document 9541/03). An informal gathering of the Employment and Social Policy 
Council meeting in Varese on 11 July - at the beginning of the Italian presidency - made 
further progress regarding the directive on electromagnetic fields. The remaining 
questions were resolved in discussions at three meetings of the Social Questions 
Working Party and Coreper during the Italian presidency. Political agreement was 
reached in the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council meeting 
on 20 October 2003 (Council document 13838/03). 
The Irish presidency in 2004 took up the final physical agent (optical radiation). It 
organised a conference on the topic in Feburary 2004 and presented a proposal in the 
final month of its term in office (Council document 10678/04). Subsequently, the 
proposal was discussed five times at the working group level during the Dutch 
presidency in the second half of 2004. Part of the discussions were devoted to the 
necessity of having a directive. Several delegations requested an impact assessment 
with recent cost estimates. Other issues involved questions regarding specific standards, 
provisions on health surveillance, natural sources of optical radiation and national 
guidelines on good practice (Council document 14287/04). Political agreement on the 
Council common position was reached in the Employment, Social Policy, Health and 
Consumer Affairs Council meeting on 6 and 7 December 2004 during the Dutch 
presidency (Council document 15686/04). 
The timing of legislative activity in the Council largely conforms to our expectations. The 
directive was stalled in the Council during the reign of presidencies with little interest in 
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the regulation of occupational health and safety (an exception being the Dutch 
presidency in 1997). No steps were taken on the directive during the presidencies of 
Austria, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain 
between 1994 and 1999. The key steps on the directive are all taken in the period after 
the 1999 German presidency split up the proposal (Table 4), with governments in the 
chair who have high levels of regulation in this area (Denmark, Germany, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden), while there was little or no progress during the term of office of 
low regulation countries (Portugal, Spain). 
Germany, with its large number of workers in the manufacturing of machinery and 
equipment, unlocked the gridlocked directive encompassing all four physical agents and 
made a proposal on vibrations, which was subsequently discussed several times at the 
working group level. Sweden, a leading country in terms of its national regulation on 
occupational health and safety, took up the second physical agent (noise) and led the 
negotiations to political agreement in the Council, which was based on a Swedish 
compromise proposal, following nine meetings at the working group level. Denmark 
made a proposal on the technically more difficult subject of radiation after having 
organised a conference on the topic early on in its presidency. During the Finnish 
presidency, several meetings were held to make progress on the vibrations directive, 
resulting in an amended proposal. Political agreement was eventually reached during the 
French presidency, which put forward a new compromise proposal. Strikingly, little 
progress was made on this proposal – contrary to the expectations of the participants – 
during the intermediate Portuguese presidency. The Dutch presidency initiated five 
meetings on optical radiation at the working group level and reached political agreement 
on this directive. 
No activity at all took place during the Spanish presidency, even though it could have 
organised, for example, an informal session on one of the remaining physical agents 
(like the following Danish presidency). Thus, most of the initiatives were taken during 
the presidencies of member states with a high interest in this area (Denmark, Germany, 
and Sweden). Similarly, we observe high levels of legislative activity at the working 
group, COREPER and ministerial levels during the presidencies of member states that are 
leading (the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland) or have high standards (Germany, France) in 
occupational health and safety. In contrast, little or no activity took place during 
presidencies with low levels of regulation (Spain, Portugal). 
Only the activities during the Greek presidency are surprising in light of the previously 
discussed results on leaders and laggards in occupational health and safety regulation. 
Whether they simply followed up on the Danish initiative or put an extra effort into 
pushing for legislation in this field, contrary to expectations, is unclear. As discussed in 
the previous section, Ireland and Italy cannot be unambiguously identified as leaders or 
laggards in the field. The qualitative literature characterises them as laggards overall, 
despite there being regional differences in Italy and movement towards higher levels of 
regulation as well as state-of-the-art machinery in Ireland. In contrast, the rankings of 
the quantitative indicators put them in or near the top group. Thus, the Irish initiative for 
a directive on optical radiation as well as the efforts the Italian presidency put into 
reaching agreement on the directive on electromagnetic fields are inconclusive. 
We can also rule out some alternative explanations. Neither a change of the voting 
threshold (e.g. from unanimity to qualified majority) nor an overall shift in the party 
political composition on the left-right dimension can explain the pattern of legislative 
activity we observed. No activity took place after the proposal was put forward under the 
Maastricht Treaty. The push towards political agreement in the Council took place after 
the treaty changes adopted in Amsterdam came into effect. However, the necessary 
voting threshold did not change with the Amsterdam Treaty. The proposal of the 
Commission (COM 94/284), which was put forward under the Maastricht Treaty in 1994, 
was based on Article 118A of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, which means that from the very beginning (only) a qualified majority was 
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necessary to adopt the Council’s Common Position (Maastricht: Art. 189c TEC; 
Amsterdam: Article 251 TEC). 
Due to elections and overall changes in the party political landscape, the composition of 
the Council changed several times in terms of the overall left-right position in the period 
under discussion. The Council moved to the right in the mid-1990s, when the physical 
agents directive was gridlocked, and back to the left in 1999 and the early 2000s, when 
political agreement was reached in the Council (Warntjen, Hix, & Crombez 2008: 1249). 
Thus, the overall party political orientation of the Council might have facilitated or even 
inspired the progress made after the German presidency proposed a split in the directive 
in 1999. This would not, however, explain the differences in the pattern of legislative 
activity in the Council in the period after 1999.  
Although alternative explanations (a change of preferences, an increased sense of 
urgency, international developments, etc.) cannot be definitely ruled out, the empirical 
pattern fairly strongly suggests a relationship between the salience the presidency 
attaches to a dossier and legislative activity in the Council. 
 
CONCLUSION 
European regulation needs to pass through the needle’s eye of the Council where 
countries can prevent initiatives from straying too far from the lowest common 
denominator due to a high voting threshold and diverse preferences on European 
legislation among the member states. The Council presidency is uniquely positioned to 
push legislation through the Council despite these obstacles. The revival of the stalled 
directive on the risk arising from physical agents in 1999 and the subsequent adoption of 
four separate pieces of legislation reflect the ability of the Council presidency to influence 
legislative activity. After languishing in the Council for years, the discussion on the 
directive on occupational health and safety was revived by presidencies which attached 
high salience to it because of their domestic high standards in this area. The German 
presidency divided the proposal into four separate directives which unblocked the stalled 
negotiations. This issue de-coupling resulted in the relatively quick adoption of EU 
legislation in this field, following proposals by Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland. 
The key steps in resolving outstanding issues were taken under presidencies that are 
leaders in the field of occupational health and safety regulation and/or have a special 
economic interest in this field. They presented compromise proposals and scheduled 
additional meetings to resolve outstanding issues. Thus, the case study presents 
evidence for an effect of the presidency on legislative activity in the Council. 
The findings relate to the period prior to enlargement in 2004. Enlargement is likely to 
have had two different effects on the steering capacity of the presidency. On the one 
hand, it raises the pressure to increase the powers of the presidency so that it can act as 
an effective coordinator. On the other hand, it makes it more difficult for the member 
state holding the presidency to push for an agreement. This might be a particular issue 
for countries with small staff numbers, a fragmented internal decision-making system 
and/or high stakes in a large number of areas. The rotating presidency has been 
discussed repeatedly in the context of institutional reform in the Council in the last 
decades. It was a prominent topic during discussions on the constitutional and 
subsequently reform treaty. On the one hand, it has been argued that the leadership 
function of the presidency ensures (more) efficient negotiations. Extending its term in 
office would thus lead to more efficient decision-making. On the other hand it has been 
noted that the delegation of special powers raises the spectre of agency drift. Member 
states have different priorities and their time in the chair allows them to search for 
European solutions to problems that are highly salient to them. By rotating the 
presidency, all member states have an equal opportunity to put the spotlight on issues 
which are particularly important to them. The Lisbon Treaty added a permanent 
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presidency of the European Council to the rotating presidencies of the sectoral Council 
formations. In addition, team presidencies were supposed to add more coherence to the 
legislative agenda. Whether or not these institutional innovations will have the desired 
effect remains to be seen. Another question for future research is the cumulative effect 
of several presidencies. Are initiatives from one presidency routinely picked up by 
subsequent ones or can progress made during one presidency be neutralised or even 
reversed due to lack of support from the following Council presidencies? 
 
*** 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Interviews were held in June 2005 in Luxembourg and Brussels with the three Commission and Council 
officials who were most directly involved in the discussions on the physical agents directives. 
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